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We empirically analyze the determinants of Initial Public Offering (IPO) underpricing using 
panel data for 29 countries over the period 1988-2005. Our hypotheses stress the importance 
of institutional and legal factors in explaining cross-country variations. We find that increased 
protection of shareholders and greater accounting transparency contribute negatively to 
variations in underpricing. When more information is available price discovery is facilitated, 
allowing for more effective corporate governance. Moreover, when equity markets perform 
well, investors anticipate companies and investment banks to time the market and require 
higher underpricing in return. Overall, we conclude that better investor protection and better 
institutional environments reduce the perceived risk of investing, and attenuate the problem of 
asymmetric information, thereby causing lower underpricing across countries. 
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One form of raising capital is selling a company’s shares on capital markets – i.e., going 
public. Going public is generally done through Initial Public Offering (IPO) where shares are 
sold to investors, usually at a price below those prevailing on the first day of trading (see 
Ibbotson (1975) for early evidence). As Ritter (2003) shows for a multitude of countries, 
underpricing is a phenomenon prevailing in almost all equity markets and, according to 
Ljungqvist (2006), pricing discounts vary to a huge extent over time. There are widespread 
theoretical arguments along with a multitude of empirical papers explaining the existence of 
underpricing in equity markets in various countries. Yet, evidence on the reasons for the 
changes in underpricing over time and especially across countries remains scarce. 
As Sapienza et al. (1996) point out, there is a range of economic, legal, institutional 
and cultural differences influencing the environment in which corporate financing takes place. 
Building upon a dataset of 29 countries over the period 1988-2005 we analyze whether and to 
what extent these differences explain variations in IPO underpricing in our sample across 
countries and over time. The dataset includes the number of IPOs along with the 
corresponding aggregated level of underpricing on a yearly basis. The countries comprise 
nearly all established and developing financial markets ranging from Western Europe, to 
Asia, and the Americas.  
We extend the literature on IPO underpricing and contribute to the growing literature 
on “law and finance” showing how legal and institutional environments affect equity markets. 
In a nutshell, our analysis supports some earlier single-country-studies showing that increased 
protection of shareholders and greater accounting transparency contributes negatively to 
variations in underpricing. According to our results, problems of asymmetric information can 
be resolved when countries enforce disclosure. Moreover, larger dispersion of “good” and 
“bad” governance among firms within a country fortifies the risks faced by outside investors. 
Additionally, our results suggest that countries characterized by more excessive compensation 
packages face greater agency problems and, respectively, higher levels of IPO underpricing.  
The paper shows that the availability of information is one of the key determinants in 
resource allocation, while the quality of information plays a crucial role in reducing 
information asymmetries. As managerial self-interests and information asymmetries can 
increase external financing costs, we argue that better information can make corporate 
governance more efficient. Consequently, lower levels of underpricing are observed in 
countries with legal and institutional environments that allow for more efficient corporate 
governance through more informative stock prices.    3
With respect to shareholder protection we find that underpricing is higher when 
majority shareholders have more leeway to repress minority owners. Moreover, we find 
evidence that the availability of public information affects the observed level of IPO 
underpricing, consistent with the Winner’s Curse model: Higher market returns prior to an 
IPO can attenuate the Winner’s Curse and induce underwriters to price issues more 
conservatively to increase the chances of success (Rock (1986); Leite (2007)). Consequently, 
we document a positive impact of the market return (and the number of IPOs) on the 
corresponding level of IPO underpricing. When equity markets perform well, investors 
anticipate that companies and investment banks try to time the market when going public. 
Consequently, they require higher underpricing in return. Overall, we conclude that more 
effective legal systems and institutional environments attenuate the problem of asymmetric 
information, causing lower underpricing across countries. Arguably, guidance from policy 
makers can facilitate private contractual arrangements and improvements in the overall legal 
and institutional environment could reduce informational barriers in financial markets.  
We proceed as follows. The next section provides some background on the causes of 
IPO underpricing. Section three elaborates on the factors that might contribute to the cross-
country variations in underpricing and develops our hypotheses. The fourth section describes 
the data and method of estimation; in the fifth section we present the results of our analysis, 
while we discuss extensions in section six. The final section concludes. 
 
2. Causes for IPO Underpricing 
Underpricing relates to the fact that shares traded publicly for the first time substantially jump 
in price on the first trading day. Thus, investors are willing to pay higher prices for shares 
when trading begins than investors paid for their share allocation from the investment bank 
that accompanied the prospective IPO. As substantial amounts of money are left on the table 
when personal shares are sold too low and the prices for retained shares are diluted, 
underpricing is costly to firm owners (Ljungqvist (2006)). The academic literature points out 
several reasons for the prevailing existence of underpricing in capital markets. According to 
Ljungqvist (2006), IPO underpricing can in general be attributed to asymmetric information, 
institutional factors, control considerations and behavioral aspects. Ritter (1984) argues that 
underpricing is related to the ex ante uncertainty about the future value of a firm going public. 
Hence, the level of underpricing can be regarded as a compensation for the risk bearing of 
investors.    4
Models of asymmetric information assume that one of the involved parties during the 
process of taking a firm public is more informed than others thereby causing the underpricing 
of shares. Underpricing signaling models such as in Allen and Faulhaber (1989) assume that 
the issuer is better informed about the firm value than the investor. Welch (1989) argues that 
the issuer possesses more information about the true value of the company than potential 
investors thereby causing higher underpricing in equilibrium as a signal. This way, floated 
firms underprice their initial public offerings in order to ensure better terms for a secondary 
offering. Underpricing is used to signal firm quality and high-quality firms can make up for 
the money left on the table initially during a seasoned equity offering in the future. In 
contrast, Rock (1986) assumes that some investors typically have better information and can 
avoid participation in overvalued IPOs. Uninformed investors get more shares in overvalued 
IPOs leaving them worse off than informed investors. This Winner’s Curse has to be offset by 
intentional underpricing in order to induce incentives for uninformed investors to continue 
participating in the IPO market. Leite (2007) generalizes Rock´s model and shows how 
market returns (or public information in general) can attenuate the Winner’s Curse and induce 
underwriters to price issues more conservatively to increase the chances of success. Hence, he 
suggests that IPO returns should be positively influenced by recent market returns. Benveniste 
and Spindt (1989) argue that book-building allocations can be a mechanism that induces 
investors to report their information truthfully. Investors submitting reserved bids only receive 
a small number of shares, which deters them from misrepresenting information. Likewise, 
more aggressive investors cause the offer price to rise. Benveniste and Spindt show that in 
order to ensure truth telling and to meet the incentive compatibility constraint, underwriters 
have to commit to a certain amount of underpricing.  
Benveniste et al. (2003) explain the occurrence of waves within the IPO market with 
underwriters’ capacity to bundle IPOs over time by establishing networks of regular investors. 
Investors are compensated for the costs of generating information across a sequence of public 
offerings. Therefore, they argue, investment banks tend to specialize in industries, and 
companies tend to go public in industry specific waves. Ritter (2003) sets forth that due to the 
large fluctuations over time in the number of firms floated, market timing considerations seem 
to be more important than life-cycle considerations in determining when a firm goes public.  
Ljungqvist (2006) emphasizes that information asymmetries cause the existence of 
underpricing while institutional factors affect the level/extent of underpricing. The notion that 
corporate insiders can ascertain actions to the detriment of ordinary investors is well 
established in the literature. As a response, the premium for outside investor rises   5
substantially to induce market participation (Daouk et al. (2007)). Correspondingly, IPO 
underpricing (as a form of pricing inefficiency) should be higher in countries where outside 
investors face more severe information disadvantages. Information frictions such as agency 
conflicts between investors and the issuing company/investment bank have a first order effect 
on underpricing. Owed to the fact that going public represents a wealth transfer from the IPO 
company to investors there exists a problem of rent seeking behavior that can induce shirking 
and side payments. These private benefits might also affect the size of the underpricing. 
Moreover, underpricing related gains accrue to institutional investors at the expense of 
uninformed retail investors. Under certain circumstances investors might even hold back 
favorable information in order to decrease the offering price and to benefit privately from 
price increases in the aftermath of the IPO. Ljungqvist and Wilhem (2003) document that with 
more discretion over the IPO allocation process, underwriters are giving shares away to 
people in the adjacency of the issuing firm. Lower levels of competition could induce 
underwriters to collude with issuing firms and existing shareholders such as venture capital 
providers during the course of the issuing procedures. Due to side payments, issuing firms are 
more willing to underprice their issues when compensated on secondary accounts for leaving 
money on the table. This way, the issuing firm loses money that executives gain on their 
personal accounts. 
Moreover, there is a growing body of literature showing how the protection of 
shareholders (by the government and the regulatory body) impacts the effectiveness of 
corporate governance. Ibbotson (1975) argues that companies going public rely on 
underpricing in order to avoid future lawsuits from shareholders about possibly 
misrepresented information or too glorious future outlooks. Hughes and Thakor (1992) point 
out that intentional underpricing might serve as an insurance against such litigations. Ritter 
(2003) finds differences between European and American IPO markets with respect to the use 
of class action lawsuits. With the pending threat of taking firms to court for misrepresented 
information the incentives for corporate fraud and insider trading are reduced. Van der Goot 
(2003) and Keloharju (1993) present opposing results for the Netherlands and Finland, 
respectively. While legal risk is argued to be a cause for the observation that more reputable 
underwriters are more reluctant to take riskier firms public in the Netherlands this cannot be 
confirmed with Finnish firms where lawsuits are rare. 
The environments in which the IPOs take place could therefore play a non-negligible 
role in determining the risk associated with investing in publicly traded stocks. Better 
environments for corporate governance enable firms to access capital markets on better terms.   6
Improvements in the governance of capital markets can lead to more efficient market pricing 
and correspondingly to lower costs of capital and lower IPO underpricing (Daouk et al. 
(2007)). La Porta et al. (1998) point out that rights granted to shareholders also depend on the 
legal rules of the jurisdiction in which a company operates and the corresponding shares are 
issued. They find evidence for differences in shareholder protection and the quality of law 
enforcement. La Porta et al. (2002) present evidence that securities laws matter for capital 
market development. According to their findings financial markets do not prosper based on 
market forces alone but rather need guidance from policy makers in order to facilitate private 
contractual arrangements. In this respect, the overall legal and institutional environments 
might have an impact on informational barriers in financial markets and could affect the 
extent to which underpricing might differ between countries.  
While there is widespread empirical support with respect to the causes of IPO 
underpricing within specific countries, empirical evidence on the factors causing the level of 
underpricing to vary across countries and time remains scarce. In the following we will 
therefore elaborate on the factors that are likely to contribute to those variations in 
underpricing.  
 
3. Determinants of Cross Country Variations in IPO Underpricing 
3.1. Equity Capital Markets and IPO Pricing Mechanisms 
Beck et al. (2004) analyze the important obstacles firms face in obtaining external capital. 
Their results stress the importance of capital market development on relieving financing 
constraints. Subrahmanyam and Titman (1999) argue that when stock markets are relatively 
small, information conveyed through stock prices is less accurate, which generally decreases 
the advantages of pending for public capital. As the stock market grows, however, the 
accuracy of information generally improves, yielding greater incentives for going public 
decisions. Benefits for firms are therefore larger in more liquid and developed capital markets. 
In general, more developed financial markets should facilitate the recycling of informed 
capital and encourage technological spill-overs. Michelacci and Suarez (2004) evince that in 
developed stock markets the flotation costs associated with raising outside equity should 
generally be lower and after market liquidity be higher, resulting in lower underpricing as a 
compensation for investors.  
In addition, Jagannathan and Sherman (2006) point out the importance of pricing 
mechanisms used in order to explain differences in IPO underpricing across countries. They 
analyze the use of different IPO pricing mechanisms in various countries and find that among   7
the countries that formerly used IPO auctions virtually all have abandoned the method. They 
argue that uniform and discriminatory auctions suffer from large fluctuations in the number of 
auction participants. Moreover, the free rider problem and the Winner’s Curse make price 
discovery more difficult. As a consequence, this might contribute to inaccurate pricing. In 
addition, fees do not differ substantially between the different methods. With respect to the 
level of underpricing, Jagannathan and Sherman find that underpricing in fixed price auctions 
tends to be larger than underpricing under the auction or book building method. Their results 
are in line with Loughran et al. (1994) who show that the use of fixed price mechanisms 
induces a higher level of underpricing. Ritter (2003) argues that the use of book building 
gives underwriters discretion over the actual allocation of shares. Moreover, he points out that 
in the US underwriters were more and more relying on favourable analysts’ recommendations 
with an increase of IPO valuations during the 90s resulting in a detrimental effect for the 
industry’s competitiveness. The reduced competition increased underpricing as underwriters 
profited from allocating “hot” IPOs in return for commission business offered by investors. 
In the following we will therefore test for the impact of financial market development 
on the extent of IPO underpricing, controlling for the going public mechanisms used. We 
derive the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Greater development of equity capital markets reduces the perceived 
risk of investing in IPO and decreases the magnitude of IPO underpricing. 
  
 
3.2. Efficiency of Banking Regulation 
The institutional framework in which corporate financing takes place is likely to affect the 
efficiency of the capital raising process. The services offered by financial intermediaries and 
the structure of financial systems can impact the internal conflicts financial institutions are 
subject to. In general, floating companies to the market is done through the use of 
underwriters who take an intermediary role between the stock issuing company and potential 
new investors. In this respect underwriters advise the issuing firms on the pricing of the IPO. 
If underwriters receive a gratuity from issuers (the gross spread) and investors, instead of only 
receiving the gross spread, there is an incentive to recommend a lower offer price.  
Moreover, if commission business can be generated in return for “leaving money on 
the table” underwriters can have an incentive to underprice new issues (Loughran and Ritter 
(2004)). Loughran and Ritter argue that during the dot.com bubble issuers placed more weight 
on future insider sales than on pure IPO proceeds. Hoberg (2003) shows that with increasing   8
market power of the underwriter more underpricing will occur in equilibrium. In addition, 
Loughran and Ritter (2004) point out that the magnitude of underpricing can be a function of 
increased incentives for side-payments. During the 90s underwriters were setting up personal 
brokerage accounts for Venture Capital providers and executives of issuing firms in order to 
allocate shares to them (a method also known as “Spinning”). This way, the banks sought to 
influence the issuer’s choice of lead underwriters. However, Loughran and Ritter (2004) also 
argue that increased regulatory scrutiny has reduced the use of spinning substantially after the 
dot.com bubble burst.  
Barth et al. (2004) provide insights into the competing views on government 
influences on the banking system. While the helping hand view sees governments as vital in 
screening entry and regulating the industry, the grabbing hand view stresses the negative 
impacts of government influences caused by corruption and economic inefficiency. Beck et 
al. (2003) examine the impact of banking supervision on the financing obstacles faced by 
corporations across countries. They find that firms in countries with strong official 
supervisory agencies that directly monitor banks tend to face greater financing obstacles. 
Moreover, powerful official supervision tends to increase firm reliance on special connections 
and corruption in raising external finance. Creating a supervisory agency that is independent 
of the government mitigates the adverse consequences of powerful supervision. Stronger 
financial institutions and more established banking supervision could contribute to lowering 
the costs of asymmetric information. 
Rajan (1992) and Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) acknowledge the monitoring role of 
financial intermediaries in order to resolve the asymmetric information problems faced by 
outside investors. The role of underwriters and auditors in revealing information about the 
value of a firm going public plays a decisive role in the extent of IPO underpricing. Moreover, 
reductions in informational asymmetries can be achieved through the use of more reputable 
underwriters and/or auditors (Carter and Manaster (1990), Titman and Trueman (1986)). 
More experienced banks that are more active in the IPO market can obtain investors’ 
cooperation more easily than less active underwriters, due to higher reputation (Ljungqvist 
(2006). Regulation and supervision could therefore help to lower the asymmetric information 
problem by controlling banks more closely. The trustworthier the information generated, the 
less pronounced would be the extent of observed underpricing. As banks perform the role as 
lead underwriters, and potentially market makers in the aftermath of the going public 
decision, we include information about the efficiency and stability of the banking system to   9
generate insights into the effects of the financial system on the extent of IPO underpricing. 
We derive the following hypothesis from these considerations: 
 
Hypothesis 2: More effective monitoring and regulatory oversight of banks reduces 
the level of asymmetric information between investors and issuers and therefore 
results in lower underpricing. 
 
3.3. Accounting Transparency  
The availability of information for investors is one of the key determinants in resource 
allocation and high-quality information plays a crucial role in reducing information 
asymmetries and mitigating potential agency conflicts (Bushman et al. (2004)). Inefficient 
capital budgeting could stem from costly external financing (driven by information 
asymmetries between managers and investors) or managers pursuing their self-interest instead 
of maximizing value (caused by a lack of efficient corporate governance). Grossman and 
Stiglitz (1980) conjecture that lower costs of private information should lead to more 
informative stock prices and disclosure therefore attenuates information and transaction costs. 
Durnev et al. (2004) set forth that corporate capital investments should become more efficient 
when stock prices are more informative and find evidence that more firm-specific variation in 
stock prices leads to more efficient capital budgeting decisions. More informative stock prices 
therefore convey more meaningful signals about the quality of managerial decisions, which 
facilitates the oversight of such decisions and makes corporate governance more effective. 
Additionally, Core et al. (1999) find evidence that firms with weaker governance structures 
exhibit more severe agency problems. Less efficient corporate governance structures lead to 
more excessive executive pay thereby causing firms to perform worse in terms of future 
operating and stock market performance.  
In line with the argumentation in Durnev et al. (2004) we would expect that greater 
accounting transparency leads to more firm specific variation in stock prices and therefore 
more informative stock prices. As more informative stock prices should allow for more 
efficient governance of managerial decisions, we would expect agency conflicts to be 
soothed. Consequently, more information available about firms pending for outside equity 
reduces information asymmetries and one should observe lower levels of IPO underpricing to 
compensate outside investors. We therefore hypothesize:  
   10
Hypothesis 3:    Greater corporate transparency and financial disclosure reduces 
information asymmetries and causes lower underpricing to compensate investors.  
 
3.4. Legal Origin and Financial Institutions 
Recent evidence suggests a strong effect of investor protection on the development of 
financial markets. More protective investment environments make investors more willing to 
invest and lead to higher firm valuations. La Porta et al. (2002) document that investors are 
willing to pay more for financial assets when being better protected by the legal system. 
Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002) analyze the impact of investor protection on the going public 
decision. They show that firms would be larger, more valuable, and more plentiful, dividends 
would be higher (and diversion of profits lower), ownership concentration would be lower, 
and stock markets would be more developed in countries with better protection of 
shareholders. 
Rights granted to shareholders also depend on the legal rules of the jurisdiction in 
which a company operates and the corresponding shares are issued. La Porta et al. (1998) find 
evidence for differences in shareholder protection and the quality of law enforcement. The 
results show that common-law countries have the strongest legal protection of investors, while 
French civil law countries have the weakest. Moreover, they find that small, diversified 
shareholders play a negligible role in countries with low shareholder protection. Shareholder 
rights become critical when managers abuse their information and power for their own 
interest. 
Beck et al. (2001) point out that a country's legal origin helps to explain the 
development of its financial institutions. Legal systems differ in their ability to facilitate 
private exchanges and to support new financial and commercial transactions. A country 
cannot change its legal origin, but can, however, reform its judicial system by emphasizing 
the rights of outside investors, by providing more certain and efficient contract enforcement, 
and by creating a legal system that adapts more readily to changing economic conditions 
(Caprio et al. (2004)). For a given level of investor protection the incentives to adopt better 
governance mechanisms at a company level are an increasing function of the country’s 
economic and financial development. Better governance mechanisms enable firms to access 
capital markets on better terms (Doidge et al. (2004)). This is of utmost importance for firms 
with valuable growth opportunities that cannot be financed internally. However, corporate 
governance interacts with the overall constitution of law enforcement and investor protection.   11
Good corporate governance mechanisms on the firm level are rendered obsolete in countries 
with poor economic development and poor investor protection. 
Given the systematic differences in the structure of legal systems and their 
corresponding enforcement we analyze how these differences might impact the level of 
underpricing in the countries under investigation. Hence, we formulate the following 
hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 4: More effective investor protection reduces the costs of information 
disadvantages and results in lower underpricing granted to investors. 
 
4. Data and Method 
4.1. Cross Country Variations in IPO Activity and Underpricing 
Our dataset includes more than 500 country-year observations from 29 countries over the 
period 1988-2005. Owed to the fact that some of the data are not available for all countries in 
every year our panel data are unbalanced and the number of observations depends on the 
choice of explanatory variables. We aggregated the levels of IPO underpricing over all issues 
for each country within each year. Our dependent variable is the annual median level of IPO 
underpricing in percent for each country in the dataset. IPO underpricing is calculated as the 
difference between the offering price of publicly sold shares to investors and the price at 
which the same shares trade subsequently in the stock market. Our IPO data arise from 
various sources, shown in Appendix C.  
Table 1 summarizes the total number of IPOs and the corresponding average and 
median level of underpricing over the period 1989-2005. Moreover, we report the maximum 
and minimum levels of underpricing. As can be seen, IPOs are underpriced in almost all 
countries. The table also shows that the number of companies going public varies widely 
across countries.  
One can infer that especially the US with almost 6,600 IPOs over the period 1988-
2005, the UK and China with around 800 and Japan with almost 1,200 IPOs are among the 
most active countries. According to the table, India shows the highest degree of underpricing, 
with an average first day trading return of almost 70%, followed by Malaysia with 56%. On 
the other end of the scale, countries with very low levels of underpricing are Taiwan and 
Austria. Based on the numbers presented in table 1, one can observe that countries 
substantially vary in the number of IPOs over the period 1988-2005 and, more importantly, in 
the average/median levels of underpricing. Due to the large dispersion in returns within a   12
given year we base our analysis on the median rather than the average level of underpricing. 
We included the maximum and minimum level of underpricing based on the median 
underpricing per year for each country. While countries like Japan, New Zealand and 
Malaysia show three-digit maximum percentage returns on the first day of trading, the UK, 
Austria, and Belgium, e.g., only report one-digit first day returns as the maximum per year. 
Apparently, first day returns are subject to large fluctuations over time and countries.  
 
Table 1: Cross Country Variation of IPOs and IPO Underpricing 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)












Australia 185 18.99% 15.68% 89.67% -1.18% 9.44 23.00%
Austria 34 2.45% -0.04% 6.34% -18.71% 1.08 6.00%
Belgium 46 9.86% 4.69% 9.48% 2.17% 4.46 2.00%
Canada 684 34.19% 9.07% 18.00% 1.33% 28.84 6.00%
China 856 16.73% 62.19
Denmark 33 11.74% 8.05% 16.31% -2.74% 2.12 7.00%
Finland 44 14.06% 1.77% 20.58% -13.42% 3.50 8.00%
France 462 12.25% 4.90% 15.50% 0.00% 27.21 4.00%
Germany 513 37.83% 14.59% 33.00% -3.50% 43.44 8.00%
Greece 341 37.50% 14.81
Hong Kong, 
China 343 6.77% 14.60% 40.72% -1.31% 10.38 13.00%
India 168 66.06% 18.88% 39.00% 9.00% 21.45 10.00%
Indonesia 125 6.14% 8.70% 45.72% -8.00% 8.55 15.00%
Ireland 6 9.78% 9.78% 22.86% -0.44% 0.49 10.00%
Italy 183 14.88% 5.14% 59.80% -3.71% 10.44 15.00%
Japan 1178 18.71% 33.03% 102.28% 2.82% 51.69 32.00%
Korea, Rep. 167 33.96% 39.70% 93.99% 0.00% 9.72 25.00%
Malaysia 182 56.24% 63.98% 137.47% -12.07% 10.13 50.00%
Netherlands 88 13.96% 7.13% 21.85% -4.32% 5.72 7.00%
New Zealand 30 11.96% 13.07% 135.12% -24.00% 1.86 40.00%
Norway 81 10.40% 7.42% 53.85% -7.42% 5.34 17.00%
Philippines 44 11.90% 15.63% 75.66% -17.94% 3.32 23.00%
Portugal 14 17.59% 17.77% 28.71% 1.78% 1.31 11.00%
Singapore 178 10.52% 19.97% 75.06% -19.60% 11.72 27.00%
Spain 75 14.66% 12.90% 18.90% -9.45% 3.75 8.00%
Sweden 183 17.83% 9.30% 72.20% -0.37% 10.46 18.00%
Switzerland 57 17.32% 8.33% 50.93% -2.31% 4.16 14.00%
Taiwan 444 3.99% 2.41% 18.64% -14.21% 27.19 9.00%
Thailand 196 14.81% 25.85% 62.67% -23.33% 10.21 25.00%
United Kingdom 838 13.92% 7.81% 20.42% 2.61% 42.65 5.00%
United States 6554 22.06% 20.19% 72.05% 7.29% 226.27 15.00% 
 
Notes: Table 1 reports the cross-country variations in IPO underpricing along with the overall number of IPOs 
during the period of investigation. Column 1 presents the total number of IPOs included in the dataset. Column 2 
and 3 present the weighted average and weighted median level of underpricing, respectively. The yearly 
percentage returns are weighted by the corresponding number of IPOs in the given year to arrive at the number 
shown. Columns 6 and 7 show the standard deviation of the yearly number of IPOs and the corresponding 
variation in returns per country, respectively. In addition, columns 4 and 5 show the maximum and minimum 
yearly returns (based on the aggregated median levels).  
 
4.2. Method of Estimation 
In the following we analyze which factors contribute to the observable difference in IPO 
underpricing across countries and time.  
 
Our equations take the following form:    13
 
it t it it X under ε η α + + Β + =  ,  (1) 
 
where underit represents IPO underpricing, Xit is the vector of variables testing for our 
hypotheses, ηt are fixed period effects, while  it ε  is the disturbance. As the hausman test 
favours the random effects specification over fixed effects – our models shown below include 
random effects. We also tested for serial correlation in the residuals, which does not seem to 
be an issue here. 
The data for this study are drawn from a wide range of sources. Appendix A lists all 
variables with the exact sources and definitions, while table 2 reports descriptive statistics.  
In our basic equation we control for general country characteristics, which are not 
directly attributable to one of the hypotheses but rather proxy for the overall state of a 
country’s development. Our basic equation includes a country’s average yearly market rate of 
return (based on log monthly returns), obtained from the MSCI Indices to control for previous 
stock market development that could impact market timing considerations for issuers in line 
with the “hot markets” phenomenon or the Winner’s Curse model (Ljungqvist (2006)). The 
model also includes annual GDP growth, along with a variable indicating whether a program 
by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has been in place for the corresponding country in 
a given year for at least 5 months. The GDP growth variable controls for the overall economic 
development that could potentially influence a country’s attractiveness from the investors’ 
perspective. The IMF variable controls for the economic environment – countries under IMF 
arrangements usually experience economic crises – and external pressure on economic policy. 
In addition, we also include the number of IPOs in a given year that enters the regression in 
natural logarithm. Initially, we also controlled for countries’ regional and geographical 
characteristics, population growth, GDP per capita and the rate of unemployment. However, 
as these variables turned out to be completely insignificant, we do not include them in our 
base model. We test the stability of our results to the inclusion of these variables below.   14
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Minimum Maximum Std. Dev.
Access to equity 5.50 4.24 6.43 0.67
Accounting 73.41 56.00 85.00 7.28
Auction, dummy 0.32 0.00 1.00 0.47
Block premia 0.07 -0.01 0.38 0.09
Blocking of shares, dummy 0.59 0.00 1.00 0.49
Book bulding, dummy 0.87 0.00 1.00 0.34
Burden of proof 0.52 0.00 1.00 0.28
Civil law, dummy 0.68 0.00 1.00 0.47
Class action suit, dummy 0.43 0.00 1.00 0.50
Corporate profit tax 0.29 0.00 0.54 0.14
Corruption 9.08 3.00 12.00 2.43
Credit Regulation 8.08 5.46 9.90 0.96
Criminal sanctions, index 0.54 0.00 1.00 0.28
Deposit insurance scheme, dummy 0.86 0.00 1.00 0.35
Disclosure requirements 0.67 0.25 1.00 13.88
Economic growth 3.48 -7.36 12.26 2.91
Financial Supervisor, dummy 0.35 0.00 1.00 0.48
Fixed price, dummy 1 0 1 0.38
Foreign bank assets 0.09 0.00 0.33 0.10
Foreign-owned banks/total banks 0.24 0.02 0.62 0.16
Governance 81.40 65.58 100.00 11.43
Government stability 8.33 1.00 11.08 1.80
IMF program, dummy 0.05 0.00 1.00 0.23
Influence of the supervisor 0.63 0.00 1.00 0.48
Insider trading exists, dummy 4.89 2.90 6.20 0.81
Management stays during restructuring, dummy 0.31 0.00 1.00 0.46
Market Return 0.07 -0.73 1.08 0.28
Max. ownership restriction, dummy 0.29 0.00 1.00 0.46
New antidirectors index 3.02 0.00 5.00 1.28
Number of IPOs (log) 1.98 0 5.12 1.31
One share-one vote, dummy 0.19 0.00 1.00 0.39
Oppressed minority, dummy 0.46 0.00 1.00 0.50
Ownership concentration 0.41 0.18 0.58 0.13
R&D Disclosure 87.87 87.87 100.00 16.09
Registered American Dep. Rec. 8.19 0.00 41.00 10.04
Relative banking activity 6.55 1.37 29.96 6.08
S&P governance rating 55.66 27.21 75.70 10.83
Security business restrictions 1.51 1.00 3.00 0.58
Security of property rights 7.89 2.40 9.60 1.33
StDev S&P governance rating 10.55 3.24 35.11 6.44
Stock market total/GDP 0.72 0.06 3.11 0.56
Stock market traded/GDP 0.74 0.00 5.28 0.69
Stock Market Turnover 0.72 0.08 3.77 0.56
Votes to call ext. meeting 0.09 0.03 0.20 0.05
Year since insider trading is legal 1983 1966 1994 9.12  
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We classify all additional variables in groups that can be allocated to our four 
hypotheses introduced above. As a first step, we add all variables of one group to the basic 
equation and follow a general-to-specific approach to identify the most important 
determinants of underpricing. Clearly, general-to-specific regressions including all variables 
would be preferable. However – given the degrees of freedom available and the unbalanced 
nature of our sample – such procedure is infeasible. We test for the influence of omitted 
variable bias in further specifications and in our robustness analysis below. Specifically, we 
include the variables corresponding to the hypotheses formulated above and then delete that 
variable with the lowest level of significance. With the remaining variables, this procedure is 
repeated until all coefficients are significant at the 10 percent level at least. In a second step, 
we check whether any of the previously deleted variables would render significant when 
added again. These significant variables are step by step included. The two steps are repeated 
until a final model converges. Our next step consists in deriving a final model by combining 
the variables from the four equations and again following the general-to-specific procedure.
1
 
4.3. Hypotheses and Explanatory Variables used 
Hypothesis 1 expects the stage of development of equity capital markets to affect the level of 
IPO underpricing. To test this hypothesis we employ stock market capitalization to GDP and 
stock market value traded to GDP (both taken from Beck et al. (1999)). The stock market 
capitalization measures are used to proxy for the general stage of development of equity 
capital markets within a country. The more established capital markets are as a source of 
financing, the less risky the investment should be for individual and institutional investors 
alike. Additionally, we included the relative market efficiency (relative to the banking sector) 
and the stock market turnover ratio (both measures taken from Beck et al. (1999)) in order to 
proxy for the efficiency of equity capital markets. The less efficient equity markets function, 
the higher should underpricing be in order to compensate investors. With respect to the ease 
of obtaining public equity capital we included the equity markets access index created by 
Schwab et al. (1999). The index measures the extent to which business executives in a country 
judge the stock market to be open to new and medium-sized firms, with higher values 
indicating easier accessibility. In addition, we employ dummy variables measuring whether a 
                                                 
1 Methodologically, we examine a wide array of potential influences on IPO underpricing for a vast number of 
countries. Although one might question the expansive approach taken in this paper, we believe that the 
interrelation between various legal and institutional characteristics calls for an extensive analysis of factors 
simultaneously influencing the extent of IPO underpricing. While a narrower focus might be more consistent 
with testing specific theoretical models (e.g. treating one issue separately), in order to gain insights into the 
driving forces of cross-country differences one needs to account for a multitude of potential influences at the 
same time.   16
country allows the use of (i) book building, (ii) fixed price auctions or (iii) auctions. As some 
countries allow all of the methods to be used, we can include all dummies at the same time – 
they are not mutually exclusive.  
Hypothesis 2 (“effective regulation reduces underpricing”) is tested employing an 
index collected by Gwartney and Lawson (2004).
2 This index relates to the regulation of 
credit markets (the ownership of banks; competition from foreign banks; the extension of 
credit to the private sector; avoidance of interest rate controls and excessive regulation leading 
to negative real interest rates; interest rate controls in general). One would expect regulation 
of the banking system in general to have a negative effect on underpricing as more regulation 
reduces the incentives for side payments and diminishes the level of asymmetric information 
between individual investors and the underwriting banks. The index ranges from 1-10, with 
higher values indicating “better” business environments. Furthermore, we include information 
about the differences in banking systems in general by including data from Barth, Caprio, and 
Levine (2004), who collected a comprehensive database on the regulation and supervision of 
banks in 107 countries. The data is based on surveys sent to national bank regulatory and 
supervisory authorities. In order to proxy for the effectiveness of banking supervision we 
included variables with respect to ownership restrictions, business activity restrictions, and 
characteristics of deposit insurance schemes. Barth et al. (2004) argue that deposit insurance 
schemes might limit the risk of bank runs and tighter official oversight could augment private 
sector monitoring of banks. Accordingly, we have included a variable measuring whether 
countries posses a deposit insurance scheme, as well as variables measuring the influence of 
the supervisor in taking specific corrective actions. Here, Barth et al. measure whether a 
supervisory agency might force a bank to change its internal structure. To proxy for better 
oversight of the financial sector we include a measure on the existence of a single financial 
supervisor. Furthermore, we include information about the regulation of banking activities, in 
particular restrictions on banks to engage in securities activities. Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2000) 
find that foreign entry improves bank performance. With respect to competition we have 
therefore included information about the limitations on foreign bank entry/ownership and also 
the share of assets of foreign-owned banks in total banking assets and the number of foreign-
owned banks in the total number of banks from Beck et al. (1999).  
Turning to hypothesis 3 (“transparency reduces underpricing”), we take several 
measures from Bushman et al. (2004) in order to proxy for financial and governance 
disclosure: A measure indicating the inclusion of 90 accounting items in the balance sheet, the 
                                                 
2 The original data are linearly interpolated to obtain yearly data.   17
disclosure requirements regarding R&D investments,
3 a measure referring to the governance 
and compensation structure of the firm
4 and the corporate transparency in terms of timeliness 
and frequency of reports. Higher values in all the indices indicate more 
disclosure/transparency. These measures supplement the disclosure requirements index 
provided by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2006).
5 All these measures should yield 
insights into the effect of accounting transparency on reducing information asymmetries 
between the firm and outside investors. As mentioned before we argue that more financial and 
governance transparency should be negatively related to the level of underpricing found in the 
corresponding countries. The availability of firm-specific information enhances the 
accountability for those governing the firm.  
Moreover, to estimate the impact of the private benefits of control that larger 
stockholders might obtain on the level of underpricing we included the median block 
premium calculated in Dyck and Zingales (2004).
6 The higher the private benefits that 
controlling shareholders enjoy, the more pronounced the associated agency problems with 
new investors would be. As such, the higher the benefits of control are, the more underpricing 
would new investors crave for in order to be compensated for the additional risks. With 
respect to ownership concentration, Shleifer and Vishny (1986) point out the positive effect 
that concentration might have on the incentives of managers. However, they also 
acknowledge the potential diversification that might stem from a certain dispersion of 
ownership. Accordingly, we also include a measure of ownership concentration for the 
countries in our sample.  
Firms from countries with weaker investor protection have found a way to facilitate 
information acquisition for outside investors via the cross listing of shares in countries with 
stronger investor protection and greater financial transparency due to stricter disclosure 
requirements (Reese and Weisbach (2002)). As a matter of fact we also include the number of 
2 and 3 level American Depository Receipts (ADR) to proxy for the extent to which firms 
make use of substitute mechanisms of corporate governance in order to overcome weaker 
                                                 
3 Specifically: capital expenditure, subsidiaries, segment-product, segment-geographic, and accounting policy. 
4 Major shareholders, management information, list of board members and their affiliations, remuneration of 
directors and officers, and shares owned by directors and employees.  
5 The index incorporates information on the existence of prospectus requirements for issuing firms, whether 
compensation of directors and shareholder composition and inside ownership has to be disclosed in the 
prospectus, and whether information regarding contracts and transactions outside the ordinary course of business 
has to be disclosed. 
6 The block premium is the difference between the price per share paid for the control block and the exchange 
price two days after the announcement of the control transaction, divided by the exchange price and multiplied 
by the ratio of the proportion of cash flow rights represented in the controlling block.   18
rules within a country. Lastly, we also include the S&P transparency and governance rating 
along with its standard deviation for the countries in our sample.  
In hypothesis 4 we argue that the protection of shareholder rights affects the perceived 
risk for investors in going public transactions and that differences in the legal system are 
important for the occurrence and magnitude of IPO underpricing. In order to test this 
hypothesis we employ a number of measures that are widely used in the recent empirical 
literature. Specifically, we employ Gwartney and Lawson’s legal structure and security of 
property rights index (including judicial independence, protection of intellectual property 
rights, impartial courts, military interference and integrity of the legal system measures).
7 
Moreover, we use the index of government stability and an index of perceived corruption 
provided by the International Country Risk Guide (2004). This indicator is based on the 
analysis of a worldwide network of experts. The index has a range from 0 – representing 
highest corruption – to 12 (no corruption).  
The notion of considering stocks only as the present value of future cash flows falls 
short of taking into consideration the substantial rights that are attached in order to give 
shareholders substantial influence in controlling managerial decisions (Hart (1995)). As 
pointed out in La Porta et al. (1998) laws and the quality of enforcement are potentially 
important factors when analysing the rights and protection of shareholders. We therefore use 
various measures from La Porta et al. (1998) in order to test for the influence of legal 
environments on the magnitude of IPO underpricing. The antidirectors index measures how 
strongly the legal system favors minority shareholders over managers and/or dominant 
shareholders. We also included some of the subcomponents of the antidirectors index. For 
example, the blocking of shares prior to an annual meeting might make it difficult for 
minority shareholders to exert their voting rights over majority shareholders. Additionally, we 
included the number of votes to call an extraordinary shareholders meeting. The higher the 
required percentage is, the more difficult it becomes for minority shareholders to drive out 
management. In this light, we also included the oppressed minority measure indicating 
whether minority shareholders have legal means to pursue in case of fundamental changes 
within the company (e.g. mergers, asset dispositions etc.). Furthermore we have used the 
“management in restructuring” dummy to proxy for creditor power over equity holders. The 
threat of management dismissal during a phase of restructuring might enhance the creditors’ 
position. Grossman and Hart (1988) argue that investors might be better protected when 
dividend rights are linked to voting rights – that is, companies are subject to one-share-one-
                                                 
7 Note that two of these sub-indices originate from the Global Competitiveness Report, while “integrity of the 
legal system” is from the International Country Risk Guide.   19
vote rules. Hence, we also include a dummy indicating whether countries are characterized by 
such rules. Lastly, we include a dummy measuring whether the corresponding country is 
characterized by common versus civil law. 
As insider trading might pose a difficulty for outside investors to timely act upon and 
benefit from the information provided in the offering prospectus, we employed measures by 
Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) on the existence of insider trading and from Schwab et al. 
(1999) on its prevalence. Furthermore, we employ various measures with respect to 
shareholder protection originating from La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2006): An 
index of criminal sanctions, a dummy indicating whether investors have the opportunity to 
engage in class action suits against the issuing firm and the parties involved, and an index of 
disclosure requirements.  
 
5. Results 
While table 3 also reports the results for the base model and the individual hypotheses for 
reasons of transparency,
8 we confine our discussion to the final model. Table 3 presents the 
variables selected by the individual general-to-specific regressions (column 10) and the final 
model (column 11). Due to the unbalanced nature of our data the number of observations is 
reduced to 267, referring to 23 countries. Regarding the variables included in the base model, 
underpricing rises significantly with higher market returns and a larger number of firms going 
public within a given year. These results suggest that when equity markets perform well, 
investors anticipate companies and investment banks to try to time the market when going 
public, so they require higher underpricing in return. Moreover, the results indicate that 
countries under an IMF program are characterized by lower underpricing, probably in 
expectation of ameliorating investment conditions – the coefficient is however, only 
significant at the 10% level. GDP growth has no significant impact on underpricing in the 
final model.  
                                                 
8 For each hypothesis, two sets of regressions are shown. The first includes the full number of variables we 
employ to test the respective hypothesis – the second contains the variables selected by the general-to-specific 
exercise.   20
Table 3: Determinants of IPO underpricing, general to specific, GLS, 1988-2005 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Base
Economic growth (t-1) 0.010 0.016 0.014 0.013 0.015 0.019 0.018
(2.00)** (3.42)*** (2.73)*** (2.14)** (2.74)*** (2.78)*** (2.99)***
IMF program, dummy (t-1) 0.185 -0.079 -0.077 -0.075 -0.077 -0.086 -0.178
(1.20) (1.45) (1.28) (1.35) (1.46) (1.23) (3.15)***
Market Return 0.240 0.132 0.133 0.155 0.154 0.193 0.162
(3.66)*** (2.30)** (2.46)** (2.29)** (2.42)** (3.25)*** (2.95)***
Number of IPOs (log) 0.027 0.019 0.016 0.025 0.024 0.032 0.036
(2.72)*** (2.36)** (1.67)* (3.88)*** (3.62)*** (2.87)*** (3.58)***
Stock market total/GDP 0.032
(0.78)
Stock market traded/GDP 0.093 0.132
(1.60) (3.62)***
Stock Market Turnover 0.029
(0.73)
Access to equity -0.050 -0.075
(2.32)** (2.78)***




Book bulding, dummy -0.051
(1.12)
Fixed price, dummy 0.013
(0.55)
Security business restrictions 0.061 0.040
(2.22)** (2.11)**
Foreign-owned banks/total banks -0.155 -0.122
(2.20)** (2.10)**
Deposit insurance scheme, dummy -0.137 -0.133
(2.97)*** (3.67)***
Credit Regulation -0.041 -0.036
(2.75)*** (2.74)***
Max. ownership restriction, dummy -0.020
(0.56)










Disclosure requirements, index 0.315 0.280
(3.58)*** (4.05)***




Corporate transparancy -0.002 -0.002
(2.59)*** (2.56)**






S&P governance rating 0.001
(0.77)
Observations 409 316 329 310 324 303 322
Countries 30 27 28 24 25 21 24
R
2 (within) 0.14 0.21 0.31 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.18
R
2 (between) 0.60 0.57 0.37 0.80 0.78 0.95 0.90
R
2 (overall) 0.19 0.30 0.25 0.33 0.32 0.40 0.39
Hypothesis 1 Hypothesis 2 Hypothesis 3
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Table 3 (continued) 
(8) (9) (10) (11)
Economic growth (t-1) 0.011 0.013 0.008 0.010
(2.17)** (2.67)*** (1.01) (1.58)
IMF program, dummy (t-1) -0.038 -0.023 -0.134 -0.106
(0.56) (0.44) (1.89)* (2.06)**
Market Return 0.127 0.168 0.171 0.167
(2.31)** (2.98)*** (2.80)*** (2.95)***
Number of IPOs (log) 0.011 0.022 0.022 0.026
(1.03) (3.47)*** (1.65)* (2.51)**
Stock market traded/GDP 0.135 0.109
(3.14)*** (3.25)***
Access to equity -0.031
(0.84)
Security business restrictions 0.059 0.043
(1.48) (1.99)**
Foreign-owned banks/total banks -0.094 -0.241
(0.79) (3.60)***








Disclosure requirements, index 0.121 0.195
(0.83) (2.84)***






Registered American Dep. Rec. 0.001
(0.20)
Government stability 0.033 0.024 0.032 0.037
(2.64)*** (2.42)** (2.86)*** (3.85)***
One share-one vote, dummy 0.181 0.204 0.011
(2.34)** (5.37)*** (0.16)
Prevalence of insider trading -0.075 -0.029 -0.015
(2.33)** (2.33)** (0.46)




Oppressed minority, dummy 0.115
(1.55)
Blocking of shares, dummy 0.121
(2.27)**
Management stays during restructuring, dummy 0.034
(0.57)
Votes to call ext. meeting 0.095
(0.37)
Insider trading exists, dummy -0.002
(1.23)
Class action suit, dummy 0.115
(2.06)**




Civil law, dummy 0.055
(0.78)
New antidirectors index -0.063
(2.29)**
Observations 333 368 253 267
Number of id 26 27 22 23
R
2 (within) 0.16 0.16 0.32 0.31
R
2 (between) 0.91 0.82 0.89 0.83
R
2 (overall) 0.35 0.32 0.47 0.46
Hypothesis 4 Full model
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Notes:  *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. (Robust absolute) t-statistics 
are in parentheses. The results shown for each hypothesis present the coefficients and t-statistics for the first 
regressions estimated (including all explanatory variables) in the first column and the resulting final model for 
each hypothesis after the general to specific procedure laid out in section 4.2 in the respective second column. 
Column one presents the results for the base model. The remaining variables for each separate hypothesis are 
then included in the final model. The final column reports the results from general-to-specific based on this 
model. All regressions are estimated using random effects GLS. Tests for serial correlation in the error terms 
have been carried out as explained in section 4.2. Dummies for each year are included in all regressions but are 
omitted from the presentation in the table. All variables used are described in Appendix A.  
 
 
Overall, the results of table 3 indicate support for some of our hypotheses, while clearly 
rejecting others. Regarding hypothesis 1 the results show that underpricing rises with higher 
values traded in the stock market (relative to GDP), at the one percent level of significance. 
This indicates that more established stock markets (in terms of volume) show a higher level of 
underpricing, clearly contradicting hypothesis 1. The positive coefficient of the stock market 
value traded could be a sign of increased demand for shares from a certain country due to 
more attractive market developments. Alternatively, Michelacci and Suarez (2004) 
acknowledge that more developed capital markets (or a relatively high reliance on equity 
capital markets) could induce younger firms to go public pre-maturely. Given the higher risks 
and the greater opacity of these firms underpricing could be higher (Gompers and Lerner 
(2002)). Evidence shows that in the US firms that go public are typically younger than their 
corresponding European counterparts (Fama and French (2001); Pagano et al. (1998)). 
Moreover, the ease of access to equity has the expected negative coefficient but does not turn 
out to be significant in the final model. Hence, there is no evidence (when controlling for 
other factors) that easy availability of outside equity reduces underpricing.  
With respect to hypothesis 2, the results show that restricting the business activities of 
commercial banks has a positive impact on the level of underpricing (at the 5% level). 
Restricting banks to jointly engage in underwriting, brokering and dealing of securities 
appears to limit the price discovery in the going public process and elevates the level of 
underpricing. Additionally, the competition brought in by foreign banks (number of foreign 
banks to number of total banks) has the expected negative impact on underpricing (at the 5 
percent level). The result suggests evidence for the claim of Carter and Manaster (1990) who 
point out the certifying role of more established underwriters for the reduction of information 
asymmetries during the going public process. Secondly, the competition brought in through 
foreign entrants could also reduce the incentive for established incumbents to engage in self-
dealing and could help to self-regulate the market, thereby depleting information 
asymmetries.    23
According to Hypothesis 3, greater transparency on the corporate level should lead to 
more firm specific variation in stock prices and therefore to more informative stock prices. 
The results show that the accounting rating of countries (with respect to the inclusion or 
omission of a wide variety of items) has a negative and significant impact on IPO 
underpricing (at the 1% level). When firms are forced to disclose items in their annual report, 
problems of asymmetric information are alleviated. Moreover, one can infer that the standard 
deviation of the S&P governance and transparency rating has a positive and significant effect. 
The higher the dispersion of governance and transparency among firms in the country, the 
higher the risks faced by outside investors. Correspondingly, we observe an increase in 
underpricing as a response. For the disclosure requirements index of La Porta et al. (2006) the 
results show that higher values increase underpricing. Bushee and Noe (2000) document that 
improvements in disclosure rankings could result in higher levels of transient ownership and 
correspondingly lead to higher levels of stock volatility. Accordingly, in the absence of clear 
information on composite investment holdings and periods, it could be that the results are 
driven by changes in institutional holdings as a response to improvements in financial 
disclosure.  
A similar effect can be found for the impact of compensation and shareholdings 
disclosure (Governance) that has a positive and significant impact on the observed level of 
underpricing. Given the data we cannot rule out the possibility that countries with in general 
more excessive compensation packages are more prone to pass and implement laws and 
regulations dealing with the issues at hand. Accordingly, more disclosure could be driven by 
more severe problems with excessive compensation packages and correspondingly our results 
suggest that countries with higher levels of executive compensation face more severe levels of 
underpricing.  
Regarding hypothesis 4, the results show underpricing to rise significantly with 
government stability, at the one percent level of significance. Interestingly, more stable 
governments contribute positively to the premium that investors demand when investing in 
IPOs in those countries. In this light, the results could suggest that more stable governments 
might enjoy more private benefits in the economy and that therefore the level of underpricing 
might be higher.  
Turning to the economic impact of these significant determinants of underpricing, an 
increase in the market return by one percentage point increases underpricing by 0.17 
percentage points. This amounts to a standardized (beta-) coefficient of almost 0.22. An 
increase in GDP growth by one standard deviation increases underpricing by 0.15 standard   24
deviations. The corresponding beta coefficients for the other significant variables are -0.10 
(IMF program), 0.18 (number of IPOs), 0.37 (stock market traded), 0.11 (security business 
restrictions), -0.17 (foreign-owned banks), -0.30 (accounting), 0.16 (governance), 0.18 
(disclosure requirements), 0.15 (Stdev S&P governance rating), and 0.34 (government 
stability).  
Regarding the insignificant coefficients, our results show that stock market turnover, 
stock market traded/GDP and relative market efficiency do not affect underpricing and turn 
out to be insignificant in the full model. With respect to the use of fixed price auctions, book 
building and/or auctions in general, our results show that pricing mechanisms do not 
significantly contribute to the variations in underpricing across countries. 
With respect to the variables indicating supervision of the banking system (taken from 
Barth et al. 2004) we find that neither ownership restrictions nor assets owned by foreign 
banks have any impact on underpricing variations. Concerning the role of the supervisor, the 
coefficient associated with the dummy for the influence of the supervisors in taking corrective 
actions and the dummy indicating whether a single financial supervisor exists are not 
significant at conventional levels. Additionally, the maximum ownership restriction does not 
have any impact on underpricing. The initial results indicate that underpricing declines 
significantly with deposit insurance schemes (at the one percent level of significance). The 
coefficient does, however, turn out to be insignificant in the final model. There is thus no 
evidence that a more protective financial system has a negative impact on the level of 
underpricing in the corresponding countries. The same holds true for stricter regulation of 
credit markets, where we can observe a negative and significant coefficient for the first 
regressions estimated, but not in the final model, when controlling for other characteristics. 
Considering the impact of accounting transparency on IPO underpricing, ownership 
concentration within the firms has a negative and highly significant coefficient in the first 
models, but turns out insignificant when we control for other variables in the final model. We 
do not find any robust evidence that countries with a generally higher concentration of 
ownership exhibit lower levels of underpricing. Moreover, the block premium turns out to be 
insignificant as well. There is no evidence that more private benefits that controlling 
shareholders might enjoy contribute negatively to the agency conflicts with outside investors. 
The S&P governance rating is not significant, while the standard deviation of this measure is 
positive and significant as pointed out earlier. This suggests, that the dispersion – but not the 
overall level – of “good” and “bad” corporate governance within a country increases the risk 
faced by outside investors resulting in larger underpricing. The number of 2 and 3 level ADRs   25
has no significant impact on underpricing (though the coefficient has the expected negative 
sign and is significant in columns 6 and 7 of table 3). We also find a negative and significant 
coefficient for the corporate transparency measure in columns 6 and 7, but not for the final 
model. There is not robust evidence that the frequency of reports and the timeliness of 
information provided have an impact on the level of underpricing when controlling for other 
factors. 
Regarding the legal environment and the impact of corporate governance on 
explaining variations in the level of underpricing, hypothesis 4 expects that more effective 
legal systems and better firm level governance should reduce risk for outside investors and be 
associated with lower underpricing. However, the results show that none of the procedural 
legal variables turns out significant. Neither the dummy variable that is one when a class 
action lawsuit is available nor the index measuring the procedural difficulty (Burden of Proof) 
in recovering losses from directors of the issuer, distributors and accountants in a civil 
liability case for losses due to misleading statements in the prospectus, or the criminal 
sanctions that can be imposed on the issuer, distributor, and accountant affect the level of 
underpricing, and the same holds true for the level of corruption and the anti-director index. 
We also do not find significant differences between civil and common-law countries 
regarding the level of underpricing.  
The results also show that insider trading does not reduce the compensation for new 
outside investors. With respect to the rights of minority shareholders we find that neither the 
dummy for the oppression of minority shareholders nor the measures indicating the possibility 
to block shares before the annual meeting, the dummy that indicates whether management 
might stay during restructuring, and the number of votes to call an extraordinary meeting 
seem to have an influence on IPO underpricing. None of these coefficients is significant at 
conventional levels. 
To summarize our results, there is some support for the hypothesis that the stage of 
development of equity capital markets affects the observed level of underpricing. Moreover, 
the results show that the efficiency of regulation and greater accounting transparency can help 
to reduce the level of underpricing. We do, however, find only slight evidence for an impact 
of legal infrastructures on the extent of IPO underpricing.   
In the next section, we test for the robustness of these results. 
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6. Test for robustness 
We examine the robustness of our model with Extreme Bounds Analysis (EBA), which is 
standard procedure in the recent empirical literature.
9 More than 10.000 specifications with 
different combinations of control variables are analyzed. The EBA approach is described in 
detail in Appendix B. Following Sala-i-Martin (1997), we consider the impact of our 
explanatory variables on IPO underpricing to be robust if the fraction of the cumulative 
distribution function lying on one side of zero (CDF(0)) exceeds 0.90.
10 We include all 
variables in the EBA that have been included in the general-to-specific exercise above. 
We present three sets of results. The first set includes our baseline variables in the 
model and adds all additional variables in combinations of up to three to the regressions. In 
the second set, the variables included in the full model of column 11 in table 3 are always 
included in the regressions, while the remaining variables are again added in combinations of 
up to three. Finally, we report the results for the additional variables when included to the full 
model one at the time, and again including all other variables in combinations of up to three 
variables. 
Tables 4 and 5 show the results. As can be seen from the upper part of table 4, the base 
model performs quite well, with the CDF(0) of all three variables being above 0.9. Moreover, 
the market return and the economic growth variable are significant at the five percent level in 
almost all of the 10,700 regressions estimated. The log number of IPOs is significant in 77 
percent of these regressions. The exception is the IMF program dummy, with a CDF(0) fairly 
below the critical value; in only 12 percent of the regressions the coefficient is significant at 
the five percent level. However, when included in the full model the IMF dummy is 
significantly negative in 90 percent of the regressions estimated with a CDF(0) of 0.97. The 
lower part of table 4 contains the results for the full model. Again, most of the variables 
appear to be extremely robust to the inclusion of additional variables. With no exception, the 
CDF(0) exceeds 0.9, in most cases even 0.95 (the critical threshold suggested in Sturm and de 
Haan (2005)). Only the economic growth and the governance variable with a CDF(0) of 0.94, 
the disclosures requirement index and the security business restrictions variables with a 
                                                 
9 See, e.g. Sala-i-Martin (1997), Fernández, Ley and Steel (2001), Sturm, Berger and de Haan (2005), and Sturm and de Haan (2005). 
10 Sala-i-Martin (1997) proposes using the (integrated) likelihood to construct a weighted CDF(0). However, the varying number of 
observations in the regressions due to missing observations in some of the variables poses a problem. Sturm and de Haan (2001) show that as 
a result this goodness of fit measure may not be a good indicator of the probability that a model is the true model and the weights constructed 
in this way are not equivariant for linear transformations in the dependent variable. Hence, changing scales will result in rather different 
outcomes and conclusions. We therefore restrict our attention to the unweighted version. Furthermore, for technical reasons – in particular 
our unbalanced panel setup – we are unable to use the extension of this approach called Bayesian Averaging of Classical Estimates (BACE) 
as introduced by Sala-i-Martin, Doppelhofer and Miller (2004).   27
CDF(0) of 0.93 are slightly below the critical value suggested in Sturm and de Haan. They 
are, however, significant at the five percent level at least in between 61 to 69 percent of all 
regressions run. We conclude that with the exception of the IMF program variable for the 
base model, our model is extremely robust to the inclusion of additional variables. 
 
Table 4: Extreme Bounds Analysis, main variables 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Avg. Beta   Avg.Std.Err. % Sign. CDF(0) lower Bound upper Bound
Base model
Economic growth (t-1) 0.018 0.004 1.00 1.00 -0.001 0.045
Return 0.156 0.053 1.00 1.00 -0.028 0.352
Number of IPOs (log) 0.022 0.010 0.80 0.97 -0.022 0.072
IMF program, dummy (t-1) -0.070 0.062 0.12 0.85 -0.321 0.136
Full model
Government stability 0.035 0.011 1.00 1.00 0.002 0.066
Stock market total/GDP 0.134 0.033 1.00 1.00 -0.053 0.358
Return 0.165 0.058 1.00 1.00 -0.010 0.311
Accounting -0.009 0.003 0.98 0.99 -0.028 0.007
Number of IPOs (log) 0.025 0.011 0.99 0.99 -0.009 0.063
Foreign-owned banks/total banks -0.229 0.093 0.96 0.99 -0.790 0.169
StDev S&P governance rating 0.005 0.002 0.94 0.98 -0.006 0.015
IMF program, dummy (t-1) -0.120 0.060 0.90 0.97 -0.374 0.054
Economic growth (t-1) 0.009 0.005 0.69 0.94 -0.014 0.025
Governance 0.003 0.002 0.63 0.94 -0.007 0.015
Disclosure requirements 0.184 0.107 0.61 0.93 -0.509 0.936
Security business restrictions 0.044 0.027 0.63 0.93 -0.152 0.251  
 
 
Notes: Table 4 reports results for the Extreme Bounds Analysis estimated with random effects GLS. The Results 
for the base (full) model are based on 10,700 (5,488) combinations with 343 (252) observations, on average. 
Dummies for each year are included in all regressions but not shown in the table. The upper part of the table 
presents the results for the base model while the lower part presents the results for the variables generated for the 
final model shown in table 2 (stemming from the general to specific procedure). Columns 2 and 3 present the 
average beta and standard error generated from all estimated combinations, respectively. Column 4 indicates the 
percentage of estimations in which a variable is significantly different from zero at the 5% level and column 5 
indicates the unweighted cumulative distribution function (CDF(0)), i.e. the fraction of the cumulative 
distribution function lying on one side of zero. Columns 6 and 7 report the extreme bounds for the corresponding 
variable. Variables are sorted according to their CDF(0). 
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Table 5: Extreme Bounds Analysis, additional variables, full model 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Variable  Avg. Beta   Avg.Std.Err. % Sign. CDF(0) lower Bound upper Bound Avg. Obs.
Corruption -0.02 0.01 0.92 0.98 -0.05 0.01 252
Blocking of shares, dummy 0.08 0.05 0.59 0.95 -0.09 0.27 247
Relative market efficiency -2.69 1.79 0.31 0.92 -10.15 3.47 252
Insider trading exists, dummy 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.90 -0.01 0.00 252
R&D Disclosure 0.00 0.00 0.28 0.89 0.00 0.01 252
Stock Market Turnover -0.05 0.04 0.11 0.85 -0.22 0.10 252
Civil law, dummy -0.07 0.06 0.07 0.85 -0.44 0.19 247
Corporate transparancy 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.80 -0.01 0.01 252
Credit Regulation -0.02 0.02 0.03 0.77 -0.09 0.09 252
Oppressed minority, dummy 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.74 -0.17 0.30 247
Block premia 0.15 0.23 0.01 0.73 -1.41 1.76 241
Burden of proof -0.03 0.06 0.00 0.66 -0.30 0.34 252
Prevalence of insider trading 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.66 -0.10 0.13 252
Auction, dummy 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.65 -0.14 0.15 243
One share-one vote, dummy 0.02 0.06 0.00 0.64 -0.40 0.30 247
Fixed price, dummy 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.63 -0.32 0.32 243
S&P governance rating 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.63 -0.01 0.02 252
Financial Supervisor, dummy 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.63 -0.26 0.25 252
Ownership -0.07 0.22 0.00 0.63 -1.54 1.07 247
Book bulding, dummy 0.03 0.06 0.02 0.62 -0.36 0.60 243
Stock market total/GDP 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.62 -0.21 0.25 252
New antidirectors index 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.62 -0.07 0.08 247
Influence of the supervisor -0.01 0.04 0.01 0.61 -0.21 0.15 252
Security of property rights 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.61 -0.08 0.08 252
Votes to call ext. meeting -0.09 0.32 0.00 0.61 -2.10 1.79 237
Access to equity -0.01 0.04 0.00 0.60 -0.33 0.29 252
Foreign assets 0.07 0.26 0.02 0.59 -1.77 2.15 252
Registered American Dep. Rec. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.58 -0.01 0.01 252
Class action suit, dummy 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.57 -0.16 0.22 252
Deposit insurance scheme, dummy -0.01 0.06 0.00 0.55 -0.79 0.37 252
Management stays during restructuring, dummy -0.01 0.05 0.00 0.53 -0.41 0.31 247
Criminal, index 0.01 0.06 0.00 0.52 -0.34 0.47 252
Max. ownership restriction, dummy 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.51 -0.40 0.23 241  
 
Notes: Table 5 reports results for the Extreme Bounds Analysis estimated with random effects GLS. Dummies 
for each year are included in all regressions but not shown in the table. Columns 2 and 3 present the average beta 
and standard error generated from all combinations estimated, respectively. Column 4 indicates the percentage of 
estimations in which the included variable is significantly different from zero at the 5% level and column 5 
indicates the unweighted cumulative distribution function (CDF(0)), i.e. the fraction of the cumulative 




Finally, table 5 shows that two additional variables pass the CDF(0) threshold of 0.95 and one 
additional variable passes the CDF(0) threshold of 0.9. Table 5 reveals that the level of 
corruption with a CDF(0) of 0.98 is significant (at the five percent level at least) in 92 percent 
of the regressions and has a negative coefficient (higher values of this measure indicate less 
corruption), indicating that countries with a more pronounced problem of corruption suffer 
from more severe problems of asymmetric information between firms going public and 
outside investors. This is in line with the previous literature, showing corruption to reduce 
investment and foreign direct investment (Mauro (1996); Smarzynska and Wei (2000)). 
The blocking of shares dummy is positive and significant (in 59% of the regressions 
with a CDF(0) of 0.95) while the relative market efficiency is negative and significant (in   29
31% of the regressions with a CDF(0) of 0.92). So there is evidence that more power disparity 
towards large shareholders seems to leave minority shareholders worse off and results in 
higher underpricing. With the possibility to block shares before the annual meeting minority 
shareholders are at a disadvantage to larger shareholders. Not being able to exercise voting 
power attached to their shares therefore causes higher underpricing required by new investors. 
Moreover, a more efficient stock market resulting in lower costs of capital and potentially 
more liquidity helps to facilitate corporate governance in the aftermath of the IPO leading to 
lower levels of IPO underpricing. The variable indicating that insider trading exists also 
passes the CDF(0) threshold of 0.90 but is economically marginal and only statistically 
significant at the five percent level at least in 20 percent of the regressions estimated.  
Additionally, the results show that the disclosure of R&D investments is slightly 
below the CDF(0) threshold of 0.9 and significant in 28 percent of the regressions estimated. 
In the absence of timely information and due to the high uncertainty associated with 
intangible capital investments, R&D activities could intensify the information asymmetry 
between issuing firms and potential investors. The results could be related to the fact that 
countries with more R&D intensive industries have incentives to provide more disclosure 
with respect to these activities. In the absence of suitable proxies, the disclosure of R&D 
might be related to the overall engagement of countries in R&D activities exhibiting the well-
documented valuation bias of R&D intensive industries (Gompers and Lerner (2002); Guo 
(2004); Chan et al. (2001); Aboody and Lev (2000)). 
Overall, we conclude that the results of our final model are fairly robust to the 
inclusion of additional variables.  
 
7. Conclusion 
In this paper we analyze the institutional and legal determinants of IPO underpricing across 
countries and time. Our results show that underpricing rises significantly when market returns 
are generally higher, implying market momentum. When equity markets perform well, 
investors anticipate that companies and investment banks try to time the market when going 
public and therefore require a higher underpricing in return.  
Furthermore, we investigate the importance of equity capital market development and 
the corresponding impact on the extent of underpricing. The results suggest that with a higher 
importance of the stock market relative to the overall level of GDP one can observe higher 
underpricing. While we hypothesized a higher stage of development to be associated with less 
underpricing, our results show the exact opposite. This provides evidence in favour of   30
Michelacci and Suarez (2004), acknowledging more developed capital markets (or a relatively 
high reliance on equity capital markets) to induce firms to go public pre-maturely. The higher 
risks and greater opacity of these firms could result in higher underpricing. Regarding relative 
market efficiency we found that underpricing in more developed and comparably efficient 
markets (characterized by greater liquidity and lower costs of capital) is lower. Additionally, 
our results suggest that entry of foreign banks can help to self-regulate and to contribute to 
less pricing inefficiencies caused by asymmetric information. Restrictions on business 
activities are found to have an adverse effect and even aggravate the extent of IPO 
underpricing.  
With respect to the role of information presentation and dissemination we find that 
corporate transparency can help to attenuate information asymmetries. Greater accounting 
transparency increases firm specific stock price variations and makes stock prices more 
informative for investors. Consequently, this enables more effective corporate governance and 
causes lower underpricing. We also point out that some of the variables might pick up 
differing related effects, namely the heavier reliance on information dissemination to deal 
with excessive compensation packages and the fostered disclosure of R&D investments. 
Accordingly, we interpret our findings in the light that countries with more excessive 
compensation packages (and therefore higher need to promote transparency) and a more 
pronounced level of R&D activity (and correspondingly more disclosure of R&D activity in 
the annual reports) are characterized by more severe information asymmetries between firms 
going public and outside investors. Accordingly, we find higher levels of IPO underpricing in 
these countries.  
Concerning the impact of differences in institutional and legal environment in IPO 
underpricing, we document that the protection of shareholders affects the perceived risk of 
investing. While we find evidence that more stable governments are associated with higher 
underpricing (possibly due to greater incentives for accumulating private benefits and 
awarding cronies) we also inferred that the protection of minority shareholders has a 
significant impact in reducing the observed levels of IPO underpricing. Here, one can infer 
that more effective legal systems and environments for corporate governance reduce the 
perceived risk of investing and decrease the corresponding level of underpricing. Lastly, we 
find that corruption works to the detriment of equity investors and document that the legal 
possibility for large shareholder to overturn minority shareholder through blocking of shares 
prior to annual meetings could induce higher levels of underpricing, as these rulings create 
more leeway for blockholders.    31
Overall we find evidence on which factors influence variations in underpricing across 
countries and time. We attribute them mainly to differences in the stage of development and 
regulation of equity markets, to variations in accounting transparency influencing the 
dissemination and interpretation of information generated and to discrepancies in legal and 
institutional environments affecting the effectiveness of firm level corporate governance. 
While we do not consider our analysis to be exhaustive, we believe that our results present an 
early step in analyzing how regulatory, legal and institutional environments shape financial 
markets and affect the perceived risk of investing. 
For future research, it might be a rewarding task to further investigate which 
additional factors impact cross-country variations in IPO underpricing. Ljungqvist (2006) 
points out that firms going public might signal firm quality via increased initial underpricing 
and might recoup the money initially left on the table when coming back to raise money in 
subsequent offerings. Given the lack of data we did not pursue an analysis of seasoned equity 
offerings in this paper. However, it could well be that the pricing of seasoned equity offerings 
might have an impact on the level of underpricing observed. Additionally, Guiso et al. (2006) 
analyze the role of culture as a potential determinant of economic outcomes. It might be 
interesting to test how systematic differences in people's preferences and beliefs interact with 
the legal and institutional infrastructure of countries. Possibly, this might enrich our 
understanding of economic phenomena by analyzing cultural and institutional characteristics 
of investment environments simultaneously.    32
References 
  
Allen, Franklin, and Gerald R. Faulhaber. 1989. Signaling by Underpricing in the IPO 
Market. Journal of Financial Economics 23: 303-323.  
 
Aboody, David and Baruch Lev, 2000. Information Asymmetry, R&D, and Insider Gains, The 
Journal of Finance, 55: 2747-2766.  
 
Beck, Thorsten, Asli Demirgüç-Kunt, and Ross E. Levine. 1999. A New Database on 
Financial Development and Structure. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 2146. 
 
Beck, Thorsten, Asli Demirgüç-Kunt, and Ross E. Levine. 2001. Law, Politics, and Finance. 
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 2585. 
 
Beck, Thorsten, Asli Demirgüç-Kunt, and Ross E. Levine. 2003. Bank Supervision and 
Corporate Finance. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 3042. 
 
Beck, Thorsten, Asli Demirgüç-Kunt, and Ross E. Levine. 2004. Law and Firms' Access to 
Finance. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 3194. 
 
Benveniste, Lawrence M., and Paul A. Spindt. 1989. How Investment Bankers Determine the 
Offer Price and Allocation of New Issues. Journal of Financial Economics 24: 343-361. 
 
Benveniste, Lawrence M., Alexander Ljungqvist, William J. Wilhelm Jr., and Xiaoyun Yu. 
2003. Evidence of Information Spillovers in the Production of Investment Banking Services. 
The Journal of Finance 58: 577-608. 
 
Bhattacharya, Utpal, and Hazem Daouk. 2002. The World Price of Insider Trading. Journal of 
Finance 57: 75-108.  
  
Bushee, Brian, and Christopher Noe. 2000. Corporate Disclosure Practices, Institutional 
Investors, and Stock Return Volatility. Journal of Accounting Research 38, Supplemental: 
171-202. 
 
Bushman, Robert, Joseph Piotroski, and Abbie Smith. 2004. What determines Corporate 
Transparency? Journal of Accounting Research 42: 207-252.  
 
Barth, James, Gerard Caprio, and Ross Levine, 2004. Bank regulation and supervision: what 
works best?, Journal of Financial Intermediation, 13: 205 – 248. 
 
Caprio, Gerard, Luc A. Laeven, and Ross E. Levine. 2003. Governance and Bank Valuation. 
World Bank Working Paper No. 3202. 
  
Carter, Richard B., and Steven Manaster. 1990. Initial Public Offerings and Underwriter 
Reputation. The Journal of Finance 45: 1045-1067.  
 
Chan, Louis, Josef Lakonishok, and Theodore Sougiannis, 2001. The Stock Market Valuation 
of Research and Development Expenditures. The Journal of Finance, 56: 2431–2456. 
Core, John, Robert Holthausen, and David Larcker. 1999. Corporate Governance, chief 
executive officer compensation, and firm performance. Journal of Financial Economics 51: 
371-406.    33
 
Daouk, Hazem, Charles Lee, and David Ng. 2007. Capital market governance: How do 
security laws affect market performance? Journal of Corporate Finance 12: 560-593. 
 
Demirgüç-Kunt, Asli, Torsten Beck, and Ross Levine, 2000. A New Database on the 
Structure and Development of the Financial Sector, World Bank Economic Review, 14: 597 – 
605. 
 
Doidge, Craig, Andrew Karolyi, and René Stulz. 2004. Why do countries matter so much for 
corporate governance? European Corporate Governance Institute Finance Working Paper No. 
50/2004.  
 
Dreher, Axel. 2006. IMF and Economic Growth: The Effects of Programs, Loans, and 
Compliance with Conditionality. World Development 34: 5: 769-788. 
 
Drobetz, Wolfgang., Matthias Kammermann, and Urs Wälchli, 2005, Long-Run Performance 
of Initial Public Offerings: The Evidence for Switzerland, Schmalenbach Business Review, 
59: 253-275  
 
Durnev, Art, Randall Morck, and Bernard Yeung. 2004. Value Enhancing Capital Budgeting 
and Firm-specific Stock Return Variation. Journal of Finance 59: 65-105. 
 
Dyck, Alexander, and Luigi Zingales, 2004. Private Benefits of Control: An International 
Comparison, Journal of Finance, 59: 537 – 600. 
 
Fama, Eugene, and Kenneth French. 2001. Disappearing Dividends: Changing Firm 
Characteristics or Lower Propensity to Pay? Journal of Financial Economics 60: 3–43. 
 
Fernández, Carmen, Eduardo Ley, and Mark F. J. Steel. 2001. Model uncertainty in cross-
country growth regressions. Journal of Applied Econometrics 16: 563-576.  
 
Gompers, Paul, and Josh Lerner. 2002. The Venture Capital Cycle. Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press. 
  
Grossman, Sanford, and Joseph Stiglitz. 1980. On the Impossibility of Informationally 
Efficient Markets. American Economic Review 70: 393-408. 
 
Grossman, Sanford, and Oliver Hart, 1988. One Share/One Vote and the Market for Corporate 
Control. Journal of Financial Economics, 20: 175 – 202. 
 
Guiso, Luigi, Paola Sapienza, and Luigi Zingales. 2006. Does Culture Affect Economic 
Outcomes? Journal of Economic Perspectives 20: 2: 23-48.  
 
Guo, Hui, 2004. Limited Stock Market Participation and Asset Prices in a Dynamic Economy, 
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 39: 495-516.  
 
Gwartney, James, and Robert Lawson. 2004. Economic Freedom of the World, Annual 
Report. http://www. freetheworld.com. 
 
Hart, Oliver, 1995. Corporate Governance: Some Theory and Implications. The Economic 
Journal, 105: 678 – 689.    34
 
Hoberg, Gerard. 2003. Strategic Underwriting in Initial Public Offerings. Working Paper, 
Yale University.  
 
Holmstrom, Bengt, and Jean Tirole. 1997. Financial Intermediation, Loanable Funds, and the 
Real Sector. Quarterly Journal of Economics 112: 663–691.  
 
Hughes, Patricia J., and Anjan V. Thakor. 1992. Litigation Risk, Intermediation, and the 
Underpricing of Initial Public Offerings. Review of Financial Studies 5: 709-742. 
 
Ibbotson, Roger G. 1975. Price Performance of Common Stock New Issues. Journal of 
Financial Economics 2: 235-272. 
 
International Country Risk Guide. 2004. The PRS Group, New York. 
 
Jagannathan, Ravi and Ann Sherman. 2006. Why Do IPO Auctions Fail? Working Paper, 
University of Notre-Dame.  
 
Kehloharju, Matti. 1993. The Winner’s curse, legal liability and the long run performance of 
initial public offerings. Journal of Financial Economics 34: 251-277. 
 
La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny. 1998. Law 
and Finance. Journal of Political Economy 106: 6: 1113 –1156. 
 
La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer. 2002. Investor Protection 
and Corporate Valuation. Journal of Finance 57: 3: 1147-1170.  
 
La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer. 2006. What Works in 
Securities Laws? The Journal of Finance 61: 1: 1-32.  
 
Leamer, Edward E. 1983. Let’s take the con out of econometrics. American Economic Review 
73: 31-43. 
 
Leite, Tore. 2007. Adverse Selection, public information and underpricing in IPOs. Journal of 
Corporate Finance, forthcoming. 
 
Levine, Ross E., and David Renelt. 1992. A sensitivity analysis of cross-country growth 
regressions. American Economic Review 82: 942-963. 
 
Ljungqvist, Alexander, and William J. Wilhelm. 2003. IPO Pricing in the Dot-Com Bubble. 
Journal of Finance 58: 723-752. 
 
Ljungqvist, Alexander. 2006. IPO Underpricing. In Handbook of Empirical Corporate 
Finance, ed. B. Espen Eckbo, Amsterdam: North-Holland. 
 
Loughran, Tim, Jay R. Ritter, and Kristian Rydqvist. 1994. Initial Public Offerings: 
International Insights. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal 2: 165-199.  
 
Loughran, Tim, and Jay R. Ritter. 2004. Why Has IPO Underpricing Increased Over Time. 
Financial Management 33: 5-37. 
   35
Mauro, Paolo. 1996. The Effects of Corruption on Growth, Investment, and Government 
Expenditure. International Monetary Fund, IMF Working Paper WP/96/98, Washington, D.C. 
 
Michelacci, Claudio, and Javier Suarez. 2004. Business Creation and the Stock Market. 
Review of Economic Studies 71: 2: 459-481. 
 
Nounis, Christos, 2005. The Greek IPO Initial Returns And The Price Cap Constraints: 
Evidence from the Athens Stock Exchange (1994-2003), Working Paper, National and 
Kapodistrian University of Athens. 
 
Pagano, Marco, Fabio Panetta, and Luigi Zingales. 1998. Why Do Companies Go Public? An 
Empirical Analysis. Journal of Finance 53: 27–64. 
 
Pandey, Anil, 2005, Initial Returns, Long Run Performance, and Characteristics of Issuers: 
Differences in Indian IPOs following fixed price and book building Processes, Working 
Paper, Indian Institute of Management. 
 
Rajan, Raghuram. 1992. Insiders and Outsiders: the Choice between Informed and Arm’s-
Length Debt. Journal of Finance 47: 1367–1400. 
 
Ritter, Jay R. 1984. The 'Hot Issue' Market of 1980. Journal of Business 57: 2: 215-40. 
 
Ritter, Jay R. 2003. Investment Banking and Securities Issuance. In Handbook of the 
Economics of Finance, ed. George M. Constantinides, Milton Harris, and René Stulz, 255-
306. Amsterdam: North-Holland. 
 
Rock, Kevin. 1986. Why New Issues Are Underpriced. Journal of Financial Economics 15: 
187-212. 
 
Sapienza, Harry, Sophie Manigart, and Wim Vermeir. 1996. Venture Capitalist Governance 
and Value-Added in Four Countries. Journal of Business Venturing 11: 439-470. 
 
Sala-i-Martin, Xavier. 1997. I Just Ran Two Millions Regressions. American Economic 
Review 87: 178-183. 
 
Sala-i-Martin, Xavier, Gernot Doppelhofer and Ronald I. Miller. 2004. Determinants of long-
term growth: A Bayesian averaging of classical estimates (BACE) approach. American 
Economic Review 94: 813–835. 
 
Shleifer, Andrei, and Robert Vishny, 1986. Large Shareholders and Corporate Control. 
Journal of Political Economy, 94: 461 – 488. 
 
Shleifer, Andrei, and Daniel Wolfenzon. 2002. Investor Protection and Equity Markets. 
Journal of Financial Economics 66: 1: 3-27.  
 
Schwab, Klaus, Peter Conrnelius, and Michael E. Porter, 1999. The Global Competitiveness 
Report. New York: Oxford University Press.  
 
Smarzynska, Beata K. and Shang-Jin Wei. 2000. Corruption and Composition of Foreign 
Direct Investment: Firm Level Evidence. NBER Working Paper No. 7969, National Bureau of 
Economic Research, Cambridge.    36
 
Sturm, Jan-Egbert, and Jakob de Haan. 2001. How Robust is Sala-i-Martin’s Robustness 
Analysis. University of Groningen, mimeo. 
 
Sturm, Jan-Egbert, and Jakob de Haan. 2005. Determinants of Long-term Growth: New 
Results Applying Robust Estimation and Extreme Bounds Analysis. Empirical Economics 30: 
3: 597-617. 
 
Sturm, Jan-Egbert, Helge Berger, and Jakob de Haan. 2005. Which Variables Explain 
Decisions on IMF Credit? An Extreme Bounds Analysis. Economics & Politics 17: 2: 177-
213. 
 
Subrahmanyam, Avanidhar, and Sheridan Titman. 1999. The Going Public Decision and the 
Development of Financial Markets. Journal of Finance 54: 1045–1082. 
 
Temple, Jonathan. 2000. Growth Regressions and What the Textbooks Don’t Tell You. 
Bulletin of Economic Research 52: 181-205. 
 
Titman, Sheridan, and Brett Trueman. 1986. Information Quality and the Valuation of New 
Issues. Journal of Accounting and Economics 8: 159-172. 
 
Van der Goot, Tjalling. 2003. Risk, the quality of intermediaries and legal liability in the 
Netherlands IPO market. International Review of Law and Economics 23: 2: 121-140.  
 
Reese, William, and Michael Weisbach, 2002. Protection of Minority Shareholder Interests, 
Cross-Listings in the United States, and Subsequent Equity Offerings. Journal of Financial 
Economics 66: 65-104.  
 
Welch, Ivo. 1989. Seasoned Offerings, Imitation Costs, and the Underpricing of Initial Public 
Offerings. Journal of Finance 44, 421-449. 
 

















    37
Appendix A: Description and Sources of Variables 
 
Base Model 
Variable   Description  Source 
Economic growth  Annual GDP Growth.  World Bank, WDI (2006) 
IMF  program,  dummy  Indicates whether an IMF program has 
been in effect for at least five months. 
Dreher (2006) 
Market Return  Stock market return of the MSCI Index for 
the corresponding country. 
MSCI Indices for developed and 
emerging markets 
LogIpo  Annual Number of IPOs. Enters the 
regression as the log.  
See Data Sources for the dependent 




Variable   Description  Source 
Stock market total/GDP  Stock market capitalization to GDP.  Beck et al. (1999) 
Stock market traded/GDP  Stock market total value traded to GDP.  Beck et al. (1999) 
Stock Market Turnover  Stock market turnover ratio.  Beck et al. (1999) 
Access  to  equity  Index of the extent to which business 
executives in a country agree with the 
statement “Stock markets are open to new 
firms and medium-sized firms.” Scale from 
1 (strongly agree) though 7 (strongly 
disagree). 
Schwab et al. (1999) 
Relative market efficiency  Efficiency of stock markets relative to the 
banking sector (Total value traded as share 
of GDP * overhead costs). 
Beck et al. (1999) 
Auction,  dummy  Dummy Variable equalling one when 
auctions as a mechanism for taking 
companies public are permitted by law and 
zero otherwise. 
Jagannathan and Sherman (2006) 
Book building, dummy  Dummy Variable equalling one when book 
building as a mechanism for taking 
companies public is permitted by law and 
zero otherwise. 
Jagannathan and Sherman (2006) 
Fixed price, dummy  Dummy Variable equalling one when fixed 
price auctions as a mechanism for taking 
companies public are permitted by law and 
zero otherwise. 
Jagannathan and Sherman (2006) 
 
Hypothesis 2 
Variable   Description  Source 
Credit  Regulation  Credit Market Regulations. Includes: 
ownership of banks: percentage of deposits 
held in privately owned banks; competition: 
domestic banks face competition from 
foreign banks (CGR); extension of credit: 
percentage of credit extended to private 
sector; avoidance of interest rate controls 
and regulations that lead to negative real 
interest rates, and interest rate controls: 
interest rate controls on bank deposits 
and/or loans are freely determined by the 
market (CGR).  
Gwartney and Lawson (2004): 
Economic Freedom of the World, 
Those sub indices marked with 
(CGR) are from the Global 
Competitiveness Report 
Foreign Bank Assets  Share of assets of foreign-owned banks in 
total banking assets; average over 1990-95. 
Beck et al. (1999) 
Foreign-owned banks/total 
banks 
Number of foreign-owned banks to total 
number of banks; average over 1990-95. 
Beck et al. (1999)   38
Max. Ownership 
Restriction, Dummy 
Indicates whether there is a maximum 
percentage of bank capital that can be 
owned by a single owner. Question 2.1 in 
Survey.  
Barth et al. (2004) 
Security Business 
Restrictions 
Measures the extent to which banks may 
engage in underwriting, brokering and 
dealing in securities, and all aspects of the 
mutual fund industry. Unrestricted = 1 = 
full range of activities can be conducted 
directly in the bank; Permitted = 2 = full 
range of activities can be conducted, but 
some or all must be conducted in 
subsidiaries; Restricted = 3 = less than full 
range of activities can be conducted in the 
bank or subsidiaries; and Prohibited = 4 = 
the activity cannot be conducted in either 
the bank or subsidiaries. Higher values 
more restrictive.  
Barth et al. (2004) 
Deposit Insurance Scheme, 
Dummy 
Indicates whether a deposit insurance 
scheme exists. Question 8.1 in the survey.  
Barth et al. (2004) 
Influence of the 
Supervisor, Dummy 
Indicates whether the supervisory authority 
can force a bank to change its internal 
organizational structure. Question 6.1 in the 
survey.  
Barth et al. (2004) 
Single Financial 
Supervisor, Dummy 
Indicates whether there is a single financial 
supervisory agency for the financial sector. 
Question 12.1.2 in the survey.  






Variable   Description  Source 
Ownership Concentration  The average percentage of common shares 
owned by the three largest shareholders in 
the 10 largest nonfinancial, privately owned 
domestic firms in a given country. A firm is 
considered privately owned if the state is 
not a known shareholder in it. 
La Porta et al. (1998) 
Corporate transparency  Average  ranking of the answers to the 
following interim reporting questions: Ea 
(frequency of reports), Ed–Ef (count of 
disclosed items), and Eb (consolidation of 
interim reports). 




Average ranking of the answers to the 
following questions: A6g (R&D), B3f 
(capital expenditure), Ca (subsidiaries),Cb 
(segment-product), Cc (segment-
geographic), and D1 (accounting policy). 
Bushman et al. (2004). 
Block  premia  The block premia is computed taking the 
difference between the price per share paid 
for the control block and the exchange price 
two days after the announcement of the 
control transaction, dividing by the 
exchange price and multiplying by the ratio 
of the proportion of cash flow rights 
represented in the controlling block. Here 
the sample median is used.  
Dyck and Zingales (2004)   39
Accounting  Index created by examining and rating 
companies’ 1995 annual reports on their 
inclusion or omission of 90 items. These 
items fall into seven categories: general 
information, income statements, balance 
sheets, funds flow statement, accounting 
standards, stock data, and special items. A 
minimum of 3 companies in each country 
were studied. 
Bushman et al. (2004) 
Governance  Average ranking of the answers to the 
following questions: B2a (range of 
shareholdings), B2b (major shareholders), 
Ce (management information), Cf (list of 
board members and their affiliations), Cg 
(remuneration of directors and officers), 
and Ch (shares owned by directors and 
employees). 
Bushman et al. (2004) 
S&P Governance Rating  Measures  firm-level governance attributes 
adopted by firms and attributes imposed on 
firms through legislation and regulation. 
Scores are for the year 2000.  
Doidge et al. (2004) 
StDev S&P Governance 
Rating 
Standard Deviation of S&P Governance 
Rating. Scores are for the year 2000. 
Doidge et al. (2004) 
Registered American 
Depository Receipts 
Number of firms with New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE) or NASDAQ traded 
(“Level 2 or 3”) ADR programs. Scores are 
for the year 2000. 
Doidge et al. (2004) 
Disclosure requirements, 
index 
Index of disclosure requirements with 
respect to the Prospect; Compensation; 
Shareholders; Inside ownership; Contracts 
Irregular; and Transactions. 




Variable   Description  Source 
Security  of  property  rights  Legal Structure and Security of Property 
Rights. Includes: Judicial independence: the 
judiciary is independent and not subject to 
interference by the government or parties in 
disputes (GCR); Impartial courts: A trusted 
legal framework exists for private 
businesses to challenge the legality of 
government actions or regulation (GCR); 
Protection of intellectual property (GCR); 
Military interference in rule of law and the 
political process (ICRG), and Integrity of 
the legal system (ICRG). 
Gwartney and Lawson (2004): 
Economic Freedom of the World, 
Those sub indices marked with 
(CGR) are from the Global 
Competitiveness Report and those 
with (ICRG) are from the 
International Country Risk Guide.  
Prevalence of insider 
trading 
Prevalence of insider trading (1=pervasive; 
7=extremely rare). 
Schwab et al. (1999) 
Government Stability  Government stability, annual averages.  International Country Risk Guide 
Civil  law,  dummy  Dummy variable equalling one when 
country is from a civil law origin and zero 
otherwise. 
La Porta et al. (1998) 
Corruption  Measures corruption in the political system 
as a threat to foreign investment based on 
the analysis of a worldwide network of 
experts. Range 0 (highest corruption) to 12 
(no corruption). 
International Country Risk Guide 
Insider trading exists, 
dummy 
Year when insider-trading laws were first 
instituted.  
Bhattacharya and Daouk, (2002)   40
Class  action  suit,  dummy  A dummy variable equalling 1 if a class 
action suit is available and zero otherwise. 
La Porta et al. (2006) 
Burden  of  proof  The index measures the procedural 
difficulty in recovering losses from 
directors of the Issuer, distributors and 
accountants in a civil liability case for 
losses due to misleading statements in the 
prospectus.  
La Porta et al. (2006) 
Criminal  Sanctions,  index  The index of criminal sanctions with 
respect to the Criminal director; Criminal 
distributor; and Criminal accountant. 
La Porta et al. (2006) 
New antidirectors index 
 
This index of Anti-director rights is formed 
by adding one when: (1) the country allows 
shareholders to mail their proxy vote; (2) 
shareholders are not required to deposit 
their shares prior to the general 
shareholders‘ meeting; (3) cumulative 
voting or proportional representation of 
minorities on the board of directors is 
allowed; (4) an oppressed minorities 
mechanism is in place; (5) the minimum 
percentage of share capital that entitles a 
shareholder to call for an extraordinary 
shareholders‘ meeting is less than or equal 
to ten percent (the sample median); or (6) 
when shareholders have preemptive rights 
that can only be waved by a shareholders 
meeting. The range for the index is from 
zero to six. 
La Porta et al. (1998) 
One-Share-One Vote, 
Dummy 
Equals one if the company law or 
commercial code of the country requires 
that ordinary shares carry one vote per 
share, and zero otherwise. Equivalently, 
this variable equals one when the law 
prohibits the existence of both multiple-
voting and nonvoting ordinary shares and 
does not allow firms to set a maximum 
number of votes per shareholder 
irrespective of the number of shares owned, 
and zero otherwise.  
La Porta et al. (1998) 
Oppressed Minority, 
Dummy 
Equals one if the company law or 
commercial code grants minority 
shareholders either a judicial venue to 
challenge the decisions of management or 
of the assembly or the right to step out of 
the company by requiring the company to 
purchase their shares when they object to 
certain fundamental changes, such as 
mergers, asset dispositions, and changes in 
the articles of incorporation. The variable 
equals zero otherwise. Minority 
shareholders are defined as those 
shareholders who own 10 percent of share 
capital or less.  
La Porta et al. (1998) 
Blocking of Shares, 
Dummy 
Equals one if the company law or 
commercial code does not allow firms to 
require that shareholders deposit their 
shares prior to a general shareholders’ 
meeting, thus preventing them from selling 
those shares for a number of days, and zero 
otherwise.  
La Porta et al. (1998)   41
Management stays during 
restructuring, Dummy 
Equals one when an official appointed by 
the court, or by the creditors, is responsible 
for the operation of the business during 
reorganization. Equivalently, this variable 
equals one if the debtor does not keep the 
administration of its property pending the 
resolution of the reorganization process. 
Equals zero otherwise.  
La Porta et al. (1998) 
Votes to Call 
extraordinary Meeting 
The minimum percentage of ownership of 
share capital that entitles a shareholder to 
call for an extraordinary shareholders’ 
meeting; it ranges from 1 to 33 percent.  
La Porta et al. (1998) 
 
 Appendix B: Extreme Bounds Analysis (EBA) 
To examine both the sensitivity of our baseline model and the coefficients of our explanatory 
variables of interest to changes in the model specification we apply (variants) of the so-called 
Extreme Bounds Analysis (EBA) as suggested by Leamer (1983) and Levine and Renelt 
(1992). EBA has been widely used in the economic growth literature.
11 The central difficulty 
in this research – which also applies to the research topic of the present paper – is that several 
different models may all seem reasonable given the data, but yield different conclusions about 
the parameters of interest. The EBA can be exemplified as follows. Equations of the 
following general form are estimated: 
 
Y = αM + βF + γZ + u, (2) 
 
where Y is the dependent variable; M is a vector of ‘standard’ explanatory variables; F 
is the variable of interest; Z is a vector of up to three possible additional explanatory variables, 
which according to the literature may be related to the dependent variable; and u is an error 
term. The extreme bounds test for variable F states that if the lower extreme bound for β – i.e. 
the lowest value for β minus two standard deviations – is negative, while the upper extreme 
bound for β – i.e. the highest value for β plus two standard deviations – is positive, the 
variable F is not robustly related to Y. 
As argued by Temple (2000), it is rare in empirical research that we can say with certainty 
that one model dominates all other possibilities in all dimensions. In these circumstances, it 
makes sense to provide information about how sensitive the findings are to alternative 
modelling choices. The EBA provides a relatively simple means of doing exactly this. Still, 
the EBA has been criticized in the literature. Sala-i-Martin (1997) argues that the test applied 
in the Extreme Bounds Analysis poses too rigid a threshold in most cases. If the distribution 
of β has some positive and some negative support, then one is bound to find at least one 
regression for which the estimated coefficient changes sign if enough regressions are run. We 
will therefore not only report the extreme bounds, but also the percentage of the regressions in 
which the coefficient of the variable F is significantly different from zero at the 5 percent 
level. Moreover, instead of analyzing just the extreme bounds of the estimates of the 
coefficient of a particular variable, we follow Sala-i-Martin’s (1997) suggestion to analyze the 
entire distribution. Following this suggestion, we not only report the unweighted parameter 
estimate of β and its standard deviation but also the unweighted cumulative distribution 
function (CDF(0)), i.e. the fraction of the cumulative distribution function lying on one side of 
zero. We will base our conclusions on the Sala-i-Martin variant of the EBA. 
 
                                                 
11 See, e.g. Levine and Renelt (1992), Sala-i-Martin (1997).   43
Appendix C: Data Sources 
 
Josef Schuster of IPOX has provided country Level IPO Data for the following countries: 
Austria, Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hong-Kong, Indonesia, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Malaysia, Philippines, Portugal, 
Singapore, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Taiwan, Thailand, United Kingdom. 
 
About IPOX Schuster: 
IPOX Schuster LLC is an independent, research-driven financial services firm specializing in 
financial products design related to global IPOs. The underlying philosophy involves 
classifying IPOs as a separate equity sector for a substantial period of time in aftermarket  
trading. The main product is the series of IPOX(r) IPO Indexes, a set of 17 indexes 
encompassing an index technology which allows for scaleable, investable and sustainable 
exposure into global IPO performance. The company has its roots in academic work on IPOs  
pursued in the Financial Markets Group (FMG) at the London School of Economics (LSE). 
IPOX Schuster LLC was officially incorporated in 2004. Since then, an increasing number of 
buy- and sell-side clients have been endorsing IPOX by distributing IPOX-linked products or 
by using IPOX products for benchmarking purposes. These include ABN Amro Bank, Banco 
Santander, First Trust Portfolios, Lehman Brothers, Macquarie Bank, Millennium Partners, 
UBS or Van Kampen Investments. Highly experienced professionals maintain the global 
range of IPOX Indexes on a real-time basis with Standard & Poor's acting as the   
calculation agent.  
 
IPO Underpricing Data for Greece is from Christos Nounis, The Greek IPO Initial Returns 
And The Price Cap Constraints: Evidence from the Athens Stock Exchange (1994-2003), 
2005, Working Paper, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens.  
 
IPO Underpricing Data for Switzerland is from Drobetz, W., M. Kammermann, and U. 
Wälchli, 2005, “Long-Run Performance of Initial Public Offerings: The Evidence for 
Switzerland, Schmalenbach Business Review, Vol. 59 (Zeitschrift für betriebswirtschaftliche 
Forschung), pp. 253-275. 
 
Indian Data is from A. Pandey, 2005, “Initial Returns, Long Run Performance, and 
Characteristics of Issuers: Differences in Indian IPOs following fixed price and book building 
Processes, Working Paper, Indian Institute of Management.  
  
Australian Data has been provided by Li-Anne Woo, Bond University, Australia. 
 
Underpricing Data for China from 1993-2001 is from Junbo Wang, City University of Hong 
Kong.  
 
Underpricing Data for Canada has been provided my Jean-Marc Suret and Cecile Carpentier, 
Laval University, Quebec.  
 
US Data is from Jay R. Ritter, http://bear.cba.ufl.edu/ritter/ipodata.htm. 
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